BuiCaSuS

Mapping and analysis of the French social innovation ecosystem

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WP2 Report

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Acronyms

CCIS	Competence Centers for Social Innovation
EC	European Commission
CHU	Emergency accommodation centre
CRESS	Regional Chamber of the Social and Solidarity Economy
CSESS	French Council for the Social and Solidarity Economy
DEETS	Departments of the economy, employment, work and solidarities
DGEFP	Government Employment and Vocational Training Agency
DLA	Local guidance and support scheme
DREETS	Regional Departments of the Economy, Employment, Work and Solidarities
DRIEETS	Regional and Interdepartmental Department of the Economy, Employment, Work and Solidarities
EBE	Enterprise serving an employment purpose
EMIS	Mobile team for social intervention
EPA	Administrative public establishment
EPIC	Industrial and commercial public establishment
ESS	Social and Solidarity Economy
ESF	European Social Fund
GIP	Public interest group
IAE	Work integration scheme
IAS	Inspectorate General of Social Affairs
IGF	Inspectorate-General of Finance
LHSS	Lits Halte Soins Santé (healthcare beds in homeless shelters)
OPALE	Objective: Priority to Housing and Employment
PIC	"Invest in skills" Plan
PTCE	Local economic cooperation hubs
R&D	Research and Development
RATP	Paris public transport authority
SSP	Emergency medical and welfare service for homeless people in Paris
TZCLD	Scheme to eliminate long-term unemployment in certain regions
WP	Work Package (within the framework of the BuiCaSuS project)

Thanks

This document is the outcome of a collaborative endeavour to map and analyse the French social innovation ecosystem, within Avise and with various stakeholders.

We would like to thank the following people in particular for their contribution to this report: Prunelle Gorget from Avise; Antonin Gregorio, Jeanne Bot and Victoria Bazurto from the association Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée, and Vanessa Benoit from the Samu Social in Paris.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Context and objectives

BuiCaSuS (Building Capacity for a Sustainable Society) is a project financed by the European Commission and whose objective is to share experiences, knowledge and tools that foster social innovation throughout the European Union. This project, which is conducted by a consortium composed of members from four countries (France, Spain, Latvia and Sweden), will feed into the establishment or consolidation of national competence centres for social innovation in each of these countries.

One of these working groups (Work Package 2) has set out to map the social innovation landscape in the four participating countries. After defining various key items of vocabulary and constructing a common mapping methodology (Action 2.1[1]), the consortium's members worked on mapping their respective countries. This report is one of the deliverables of the "WP2" working group. It presents a summary of the work accomplished by Avise and its partners throughout France.

1.2. Inquiry question

The "inquiry question" is the preliminary to any investigation and the starting point of the process that led to this report. The question approved by the BuiCaSuS consortium is the following: *What are the factors that foster (enabling conditions) or impede (bottlenecks/ barriers) mature social innovation initiatives to be upscaled and/or transformed into public policies in the sector of social services?*

However, the members of the consortium were allowed a certain latitude in their interpretation of the question so that it could be adapted to their national contexts. In the French context, the notion of "fragile people"[2] was preferred over the literal translation of "services sociaux" as "social services", to clarify the consideration given

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[1] For further information about the purpose of WP2, see the methodological note entitled "Working Paper" (in English), accessible here: *https://buicasus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/BuiCaSuS_2.1.1_R_conceptsanalytical_grid_Draft_final_reducedsize.pdf*

[2] By this we mean any fragility of an economic, social, physical, mental or other nature.

to private initiatives, over and above the social services provided by government departments.

The inquiry question that underpins the work conducted by Avise and its partners within the framework of WP2 is therefore the following:

> What factors foster (favourable conditions) or hinder (unfavourable conditions) the upscaling of social innovations or their translation into public policies for the benefit of fragile people?

2. Methodology

The methodology chosen to carry out this mapping is borrowed from the work undertaken by the leader of this working group (WP2), the Spanish Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030[3], subsequently approved by the entire consortium.

As specified in the methodological note[4], the ecosystem analyses conducted within the framework of WP2 concern (1) mature social innovation initiatives, (2) for the benefit of fragile people, and (3) entailing a certain degree of involvement of public stakeholders. It should moreover be pointed out that this mapping exercise is not aimed at drawing up an exhaustive list of initiatives.

Figure 1 below, which is taken and adapted from the methodological note, sets out the various steps in the process, described below.

Figure 1: Steps in the mapping process

Framing	• Restate and adapt the inquiry question • Study the legislative and political context
Selection	• Define the selection criteria • Make an inventory of the projects and select the case studies
Listening	• Indepth analysis: case studies
Analyse	• Draft a coherent description of the social innovation ecosystems

2.1. Study of the legislative and political context

After presenting the inquiry question - adapted to the French context - by way of introduction, in the following section this report sets out a concise study of the legislative and political background to social innovation. This study consists in analysing the documents with a view to answering the following questions:

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[3] Ministerio de derechos sociales y agenda 2030
[4] Accessible here: *https://buicasus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/BuiCaSuS_2.1.1_R_conceptsanalytical_grid_Draft_final_reducedsize.pdf*

- Does France have legislation that explicitly relates to social innovation?
- What role have the French authorities (and specifically the authority that manages the European Social Fund (ESF)) played in developing public policies on social innovation? Have they appointed organisations to facilitate the processes of designing, prototyping, systematising, upscaling, financing, evaluating, etc. social innovation initiatives?
- In France, are there specific support structures dedicated to social innovation initiatives and supported by public policy, and financing offers?
- Has the literature review identified the national social innovation ecosystem's challenges, strengths and inhibiting factors?
- Have the social innovation initiatives been mapped in the past? What were the methodologies used and the research focus areas? What conclusions were drawn?

2.2. Inventory and selection of social innovation initiatives

Concurrently with this study, a survey of social innovation initiatives was conducted. Initially, over 70 initiatives addressing the needs of fragile people in France were listed through a questionnaire, along with a brief description of the actions taken and the corresponding structure (see Appendix 1: Short form and Appendix 2: List of the social innovation initiatives surveyed (Phase 1)). The form was initially posted online on the BuiCaSuS website[5] and circulated to Avise's partner associations (see Appendix 3: List of partner associations) and to the "Emergence & Acceleration" community of 120 social innovation guides. The responses collected came from these various stakeholders, in addition to the responses submitted directly by the Avise team.

Around 20 of these initiatives were subsequently selected on the basis of various criteria, including:

- The innovative nature of the initiatives;
- Their maturity;
- Their complexity;
- Access to the information;
- The diversity of the projects in the selection.

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[5] Find the page here: https://buicasus.eu/recensement-projets-bonnes-pratiques/

To gain a deeper understanding of these initiatives, their project sponsors were invited to fill out a more detailed form (see Appendix 4: Detailed form and Appendix 5: List of social innovation initiatives that met Phase 2)

2.3. In-depth analysis of case studies

Following this pre-selection, Avise chose two initiatives for more in-depth analysis. The purpose of this step was to gain insights into the role that certain social innovation initiatives can play in fostering far-reaching societal change by influencing public policies and by acting on the legislative framework.

Once again, the selection was based on a set of predefined criteria:

- Their maturity;
- Their economic viability;
- The scope of the upscaling and the potential for far-reaching societal change;
- The availability of the project owners;
- The variety of the sectors, geographical areas and approaches.

The methodology used for this in-depth analysis is grounded on semi-structured bilateral interviews with a particular focus on the project's advocacy, its origins, the stakeholders and key stages in its development, and the initiative's success factors and impediments (see Appendix 6: Individual interview framework).

3. Backgrounds to social innovation in France

3.1. Legislative recognition

Social innovation has been built into the strategy and programming of the European Union's structural funds for the past decade ("Social Innovation Europe" platform, Europe 2020 Strategy, ESF+, etc.). It has also enjoyed legislative and political recognition in France since 2014, at both national and regional level (Avise, 2019).

As early as 2010, proposals advocating social innovation were submitted to the Prime Minister in a report by parliamentarian Francis Vercamer on the social and solidarity economy (Vercamer, 2010). A few years later, social innovation was formally defined by law. The French LAW No. 2014-856 of 31 July 2014 on the social and solidarity economy, known as the "SSE Law", set out to develop and improve the financing of social innovation in France, and proposes a definition of the SSE in its Article 15:

"I. - The plan of one or more companies to offer goods or services with one of the following characteristics is deemed to lie within the scope of social innovation:

1° Either meet social needs that are unmet or poorly met, whether under current market conditions or within the framework of public policies;

2° Or meet social needs through an innovative form of enterprise, through an innovative process of producing goods or services, or through an innovative way of organising work. The consultation and development procedures for socially innovative projects with which the beneficiaries concerned by this type of project are associated, as well as the methods of financing such projects, also come under social innovation. [...]" (Légifrance, 2014).

This same article moreover states that the French Council for the Social and Solidarity Economy (CSESS) lays down the guidelines for defining social innovation (ibid.). Drawing on the work carried out from 2011 under the auspices of Avise and Mouves (Avise, 2011), the CSESS accordingly drew up a set of guidelines for defining a project or business that is socially innovative. Even though these criteria are not ranked and do not have any specific weighting, they nevertheless provide social innovation stakeholders with a common basis that can be adapted to meet their requirements and the context of each project (CSESS, 2017).

3.2. Incorporation into public policies

Over and above the legislative framework, social innovation is incorporated into certain French public policies. On a regional scale, for example, each French regional council has a Regional Plan for Economic Development, Innovation and Internationalisation (SRDEII), which includes a section related to the social and solidarity economy (SSE) and social innovation (Avise, 2022).

At national level, there are numerous schemes and programmes, either conducted by the State itself or funded by the government and operated by third parties. The list below, while not exhaustive, presents a varied selection of examples:

- **Banque des Territoires**: created by the Caisse des Dépôts in 2018, this public investor steps in to finance projects led by the regions. Supporting social innovation and the SSE is a key focus of the fields in which it operates, following on from the actions financed up until now by the Caisse des Dépôts, as shown by the agreement signed on 3 November 2020 with the Secretary of State for the Social, Solidarity and Responsible Economy. The Banque des Territoires pledged to make 300 million euros available between 2020 and 2022 to step up the support and financing of businesses in the SSE and social innovation (Caisse des Dépôts, 2020). The initiatives conducted by Avise, the DLA local support scheme, the PIC "Invest in Skills" plan and the social-impact contracts, presented in this document, are among the many programmes and schemes co-financed and/or managed by the Banque des Territoires.

- **Bpifrance**: the Banque publique d'investissement ("Bpifrance") is a sovereign wealth fund created by merging OSEO, CDC Entreprises and FSI, following the Act of 31 December 2012. To fulfil its purpose of financing and supporting businesses, Bpifrance has made the ecological and energy transition a strategic priority since 2020 and contributes to financing social innovation (Bpifrance, 2021). After having tested a Social Innovation Fund (SIF) to support social innovation projects in the French regions from 2015 to 2017, and having paid out a total of 4.8 million euros to 45 projects, Bpifrance launched the SIF 2 in 2019. This new fund aims to help finance projects representing a total investment of around 21 million euros (Légifrance, 2019).

- **Social impact bonds**: this innovative method of financing social innovation supports projects that address social or environmental needs that are not, or only inadequately, met by the State. This financial tool, which originated in Great Britain, was tested in France as early as 2016 when six contracts were

launched. In 2020, three calls for projects were initiated, each endowed with 10 million euros, to finance around 10 projects (Avise, 2021)

- **Housing First**: within the framework of the five-year plan to combat homelessness, launched by the President of the Republic in September 2017, Housing First has set out to achieve a structural reform of the policy to combat homelessness. This approach, which has already been tested in the Scandinavian and English-speaking countries, aims to put homeless people directly into a permanent home rather than scrambling to find emergency shelter. Since 2018, 23 regions have begun fast-tracking this scheme (Government, 2021).

- **PIC "Invest in skills" plan**: the PIC has 15 billion euros to invest over the period 2018-2022 and, in five years, aims to train 2 million job seekers with little or no qualifications, and young people excluded from the job market. One of the calls for projects will relate to refugees' integration into the labour market, for which the State provides financial support for social innovation projects (French Ministry of Labour and Insertion, 2021).

- **Pôles Territoriaux de Coopération Economique (PTCE)**: these local economic cooperation hubs are recognised by Article 9 of the 2014 Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) Law. PTCEs are groups of SSE businesses and other stakeholders from the rest of the economy in a given region, whose objective is to foster cooperation on innovative and solidarity-driven regional projects (Légifrance, 2014). The PTCE tool provides a legal and financial framework for these cooperations.

3.3. European Social Fund support for social innovation

In addition to the above-mentioned national funding schemes, the French social innovation ecosystem can also draw on the possibilities offered by the European Social Fund. The DGEFP (Government Employment and Vocational Training Agency), which is the fund's managing authority in France, delegates part of its management to various intermediate bodies, including Avise since 2004. Over the period 2014-2020, the latter was delegated the task of managing a total subsidy of around 16 million euros, which enabled it to finance some of its projects, along with several social-utility organisations through various calls for projects (Avise, 2021).

Among the projects receiving support under the 2014-2020 programme are initiatives aimed at:

- Developing collaborative projects between SSE enterprises and traditional enterprises to foster the recruitment of those people who face particular difficulties in finding a job;
- Develop economic cooperation aimed at boosting social innovation, inclusion and employment in the regions;
- Support the upscaling of SSE enterprises that are creating jobs;
- Design, test and disseminate tools and approaches for evaluating social impact;
- Roll out initiatives such as the "Fabriques à initiative" in fragile regions.

3.4. Dedicated support structures

There are a growing number of support programmes and schemes for which social innovators are eligible in France. On one hand, the traditional support schemes for innovation and business start-ups are becoming more aware of the issue and gradually more receptive to social innovation. And on the other hand, the ecosystem of guidance and support specifically for the SSE is well-suited to social innovation projects because it has lengthy experience of the subject (Avise, 2019) and because the great majority of these projects are developed by companies in the SSE. This ecosystem has been relatively well described and mapped, in particular by Avise, whose missions revolve precisely around the development of the SSE and social innovation in France, by providing project owners with resources and helping to build a supportive ecosystem.

For example, Avise has been leading the "Emergence & Accélération" community since 2015, which currently comprises 180 support schemes for SSE companies, managed by over 120 stakeholders present in France (Avise, 2021). Various resources are available in Avise's SSE resource centre, including:

- A map of the guidance and support schemes[6];
- A map of the stakeholders involved in guiding and supporting the emergency and acceleration of SSE[7];
- A map of guidance and support resources for consolidation and upscaling[8];
- A directory of support stakeholders[9].

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[6] Accessible here: https://www.avise.org/entreprendre/se-faire-accompagner/cartographie-de-laccompagnement
[7] Accessible here: https://www.avise.org/ressources/cartographies-des-acteurs-de-laccompagnement-a-lemergence-et-lacceleration-ess
[8] Accessible here: https://www.avise.org/ecosysteme-de-laccompagnement-a-la-consolidation-et-au-changement-dechelle
[9] Accessible here: https://www.avise.org/annuaire-des-acteurs

Moreover, the Regional SSE Chambers (CRESS), coordinated at national level by ESS France, are also developing collectives of support stakeholders on a regional scale, while the network of local support schemes covers France at regional and departmental level. The local support scheme is the leading public body supporting SSEs in France, and supports 6,000 structures per year. Lastly, at national level, the Avise portal, avise.org, and the hubess.fr platform launched by the Banque des Territoires in 2017 direct project owners to sources of guidance and support, depending on their needs and their location.

As for upscaling social innovation - an issue at the centre of this report's inquiry question - there are also programmes devoted to supporting the initiative, led by the foundation La France s'engage, the accelerator Antropia, the Fondation Macif and Avise.

This broad survey, though not exhaustive, nevertheless enables us to state that the French ecosystem has a relatively plentiful range of guidance and support for social innovators at every stage of their development, from seed financing to upscaling.

3.5. Mapping social innovation initiatives

Several stakeholders in the French ecosystem have conducted various initiatives to map social innovation projects in themselves, though none of them can claim to be exhaustive. Examples include the "Carrefour des innovations sociales"[10], "Carteco"[11], "Bleu Blanc Zèbre",[12] "Sparknews"[13] and "Shamengo".[14]

There are also collective maps that group together the members of a specific programme, network or call for projects. Examples include the PIN'S programme, the Fondation La France s'engage, and the Impact France movement, which have lists of their alumni, award-winners or members.

Nonetheless, it can be difficult to identify certain projects if they lie outside the channels and networks of the SSE and social innovation, or are unaware that their action is part of the SSE. Lastly, keeping this type of mapping initiative current and up to date requires constant attention and work, and can be a challenge insofar as there is a regular turnover of initiatives that start up, develop or disappear, as with any emerging enterprise.

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[10] For further information: https://www.carrefourdesinnovationssociales.fr/fr
[11] For further information: https://carteco-ess.org/annuaire
[12] For further information: https://www.bleublanczebre.fr/projets/
[13] For further information: https://www.sparknews.com/solutions/
[14] For further information: https://www.shamengo.com/

3.6. The national ecosystem's features

In France, social innovation is recognised in the legislation and built into certain public policies; it receives financial support from the French and European authorities, and is eligible for various forms of guidance and support that have already been mapped out. However, more needs to be done to build social innovation into public policies, and the public authorities are continuing to work on their stance on the subject, as witnessed by the commissioning of a report on the financing of social innovation in 2019 (the "Schatzman Report") by Christophe Itier, then High-Commissioner for the Social and Solidarity Economy and Social Innovation.

The French social innovation ecosystem, which is "very rich by comparison with other European countries" (Schatzman, 2020), features many strengths and good practices implemented by the stakeholders that support its development. The BuiCaSuS project's WP4 listed a number of these, on the subjects of financing, support and research into social innovation. That said, this ecosystem faces a variety of challenges and still have certain weaknesses.

In connection with the BuiCaSuS project, aimed at establishing or strengthening the skills centres for social innovation in each of the countries concerned, it should be pointed out that France already has such a centre. Avise, which has been commissioned to play this role by the DGEFP (the ESF's management authority in France), has also been an intermediate body of the European Social Fund at national level since 2004.

3.6.1. Financing social innovation

Regarding the financing of social innovation, the Schatzman Report is a reminder that French project owners can potentially count on public investment financing schemes (Banque Publique d'Investissement, Crédit d'impôt recherche, etc.), financing schemes earmarked for social innovation (e.g. SIF), or a well-developed ecosystem of social impact investing, including a number of seed-capital funds. However, we underscore a need for training and support for the stakeholders, whether financiers or innovators, to enable better use of the existing financing tools. The officials responsible for the common-law schemes have little training in social innovation, while social innovators do not always know who to approach. This lack of clarity in the available offering is also a remark that will be made below with regard to the support.

Moreover, because of the very nature of social innovation, the return on investment that a financier can expect to receive is primarily social and/or environmental, which can be a relatively long time coming. Accordingly, Avise reminds stakeholders that they need to be patient and convinced of their investments' long-term impacts (Avise, 2019). These social and environmental impacts are not always monetizable, and this factor is another downside to social innovation projects in the eyes of certain financiers, who will confine themselves to "measured risk taking" (Schatzman, 2020). As well as being an important aspect for these financiers, the measurability of the social impact is sometimes even a key factor in the establishment - and the success - of initiatives such as social impact bonds (Lavenir, 2019), and social innovators need a more thorough grounding in this subject.

Also, certain specific features of social innovation projects can impede access to certain types of financing. The lack of recognition of research and development (R&D) in the human and social sciences; the experimental testing phase of a social innovation, and the limitations of certain legal forms, such as the impossibility for an association to remunerate investors, are therefore recurrent impediments to investment (Avise, 2021).

Lastly, the Schatzman Report remarked in 2020 that certain recent political decisions could undermine social innovators, in particular the abolition of subsidised jobs and the wealth tax, or the law on sponsorship (Schatzman, 2020).

3.6.2. Advisory services for social innovators

As mentioned above, there is a wide range of guidance and support available for social innovators in France. However, this offering is not very easy to grasp as yet, the guidance and support ecosystem changes regularly and the concept of social innovation remains imprecise, even for the project owners themselves. Moreover, the interviews conducted within the framework of WP4 have highlighted difficulties in financing these support initiatives.

Lastly, the social innovation ecosystem generally would benefit from a greater connection and mutual knowledge between its stakeholders, including the support structures and schemes, and with the stakeholders involved in guidance and support for conventional business start-ups. These same findings also emerged from the WP4 discussions.

3.6.3. The ecosystem's challenges

In view of these weaknesses and areas for improvement in the ecosystem and its stakeholders, several major challenges can be spotlighted. We will mention only a few of them here.

Public policies and the tools for financing and supporting innovation must be opened up and include more social innovation. This could be achieved by raising awareness among public decision-makers and the banking networks, for example.

Partnership initiatives and research that draw together researchers, civil society, businesses and associations must be encouraged by training social innovators to conduct R&D projects, by promoting collective and territorial approaches to social innovation, and by supporting social R&D projects. Moreover, it must become standard practice to measure the social impacts of social innovation projects.

Lastly, the national ecosystem for supporting the SSE and social innovation must be strengthened. Its financial and operational cooperation with public and private-sector stakeholders is essential for its consolidation and development. In April 2022, Avise, with the backing of the Emergence & Acceleration community, published a white paper on cooperating with SSE incubators and accelerators in the SSE economy to develop social innovation in the regions (*"Coopérer avec les incubateurs et accélérateurs de l'ESS pour développer l'innovation sociale sur les territoires"*). It called on public policy-makers, businesses, foundations, banks and start-up angels to "enter into new, multifarious cooperations with incubators and accelerators in the SSE and spark transition and social innovation in the regions" (Avise, 2022).

4. Upscaling social innovations: case studies

4.1. Definition of upscaling and purpose of the case studies

The notion of "upscaling" a structure or a social innovation project refers back to the "process by which the structure endeavours to protect or maximise its social impact by consolidating its organisation or drawing on its ecosystem". (Avise, 2021). It follows that the term "upscaling" should not to be confused with the term "growth", which reflects the endogenous development of a structure without any substantial change to its internal and partnership organisation.

Avise identifies five strategies for upscaling:

- Diversification;
- Duplication;
- Fertilisation;
- Cooperation;
- Merger.

These strategies describe various ways in which SSE organisations can maximise their social impact. Upscaling accordingly entails heightening the social impact on the beneficiaries, in qualitative and/or quantitative terms, and can play a part in transforming public policies through its action and/or through the power of influence and advocacy. François Dechy insists on the importance for SEE stakeholders to assume the political project they lead,[15] and, in the introduction to the Avise guide to upscaling strategies, he sums it up as follows: "Given the very substantial stakes we face [...], we need to combine the government's drive and the organised civil society's commitment."(Avise, 2021).

Since the drivers and inhibitors of SSE companies' upscaling are already discussed in various studies and analyses (including the first part of this report), it was decided to concentrate here on the relations between social innovations and public policies. The following two case studies will therefore endeavour to explore the way in which social innovation initiatives can influence public policies and have an effect on the legislative framework, in the interests of upscaling their actions and their impact.

The analyses presented below are taken from the interviews conducted with the association Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée and with the Samusocial de

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[15]Mayor of Romainville, founder of the Baluchon group and member of the Avise executive board.

Paris, an emergency medical and welfare service for homeless people in Paris (see [Appendix 7: List of interviewees](#)), and further research.

4.2. Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée

4.2.1. Summary of the main lessons learnt

Presentation	The association "Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée" was set up in 2016 to demonstrate that it is possible, on the scale of small areas, at no significant additional cost for the community, to offer all long-term unemployed people an open-ended employment contract for the number of hours they choose by developing useful jobs that address the area's needs.
Drivers and success factors	- Deliver an impactful message to advance a social project - Build an argument backed by figures - Draw on political support at legislative and executive levels - Benefit from the project owners' notoriety and legitimacy - Ensure a suitable distribution of roles within a triptych of organisations - Adopt an experimental approach - Successfully work in collaboration with decentralised State departments and the stakeholders leading work integration initiatives
Inhibitors	- Convince partners and financiers and dispel their doubts - Difficulties in evaluating the trial - Media reach of criticism of the project - Language barrier inhibiting an international spin-off

4.2.2. Project presentation

Based on the principle that "everyone has the duty to work and the right to a job", as stated in the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 (Légifrance, 1946), the *Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée* (TZCLD) project has set out to address the

needs of the long-term unemployed. Under the project, eligible people can be employed on an open-ended contract for the number of hours they choose, and paid a minimum wage[16] by an enterprise serving an employment purpose (EBE) in the social and solidarity economy, for activities not covered by the private sector in the area in question (e.g. services to associations, local concierge services, etc.). Three main hypotheses underpin these trial schemes: "no-one is unemployable", "there is no shortage of work" and "there is no shortage of money".

In the mid-1990s, an initial trial scheme was launched in Seiches-sur-le-Loir by the entrepreneur Patrick Valentin, at a time when nearly one out of 10 people[17] in France was unemployed (INSEE, 2016). The Préfecture du Maine-et-Loire vetoed the project in 1994, but it was subsequently relaunched in 2011 following Mr Valentin's meeting with ATD Quart-Monde. Together, they carried out a macro-economic study of the cost of joblessness for financiers such as the State, the Social Security system, the *départements* and the private bodies providing top-up cover. This study, which was updated in 2017, assessed the cost of joblessness at between 43 and 50 billion euros per year, or 15,000 euros per person in the target population[18] (Prost, Abrossimov, & Valentin, 2017). This hypothesis adds up the "lost revenue" in term of taxes and social security contributions, the benefits and allowances saved, and the costs theoretically induced by the social consequences of unemployment on the person's safety or health, for example (Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée, 2022).

At the same time, the project came to the notice of French MP Laurent Grandguillaume, who in 2014 formed a group of MPs to evaluate and promote the project with a view to bringing a draft bill before the National Assembly. The draft bill was unanimously adopted by the National Assembly and the Senate in February 2016. It was to be followed by the establishment of the Fonds d'expérimentation territoriale contre le chômage de longue durée (funding to test regional trial schemes to combat long-term unemployment) in June 2016, then by the creation of the association Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée (TZCLD) in October 2016 by ATD Quart Monde, Secours Catholique, Emmaüs France, Le Pacte civique and the Fédération des acteurs de la solidarité, subsequently joined by Coorace, APF France Handicap and Solidarités Nouvelles face au Chômage, among others.

While the TZCLD association manages the political project and leads and develops its various stages, the experimentation fund authorises the new regions, guides and

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[16] *Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance*: the legal minimum hourly wage in France.
[17] As understood by the International Labour Office.
[18] Within the framework of the above-mentioned study, "the study cohort is comprised of the job-seekers not eligible for Category A, B or C unemployment benefits" (Prost, Abrossimov, & Valentin, 2017).

supports the authorised regions, in particular by financing a portion of the remuneration of the people hired in the recognised companies, and evaluates the experimentation. The Board of Directors of the Experimentation Fund is comprised of representatives of the State, of the employee and employer trade unions, regional authority associations, members of parliament, territories and other public bodies involved in the trial scheme. The figure below presents the organisation of the TZCLD trial scheme.

Figure 2. Diagram of the organisation of the Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée trial scheme.

Source: (Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée, 2022)

Following adoption of Act No. 2016-231 of 29 February 2016, the TZCLD scheme was tested in 10 areas. Of the nearly 2,000 volunteer beneficiaries met from 2016 to 2019, the experience enabled 60% of them to find work, either directly by being hired by an EBE (69% of them) or indirectly through a mobilisation method before entering an EBE (25%). The remaining 6% are people who left to undertake training, who retired or who moved house, etc. The beneficiaries, whose average age was 44 and of whom 21% were recognised as having a disability, had been without work for around 54 months on average (TZCLD & ETCLD, 2019). In 2020, the trial scheme was

extended to at least another 50 areas over three years thanks to Act No. 2020-1577 of 14 December 2020 (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Economic Inclusion, 2021).

4.2.3. Drivers and success factors

The interview conducted with the TZCLD teams revealed numerous success factors. Whether these are contextual factors, the work done by the project or a matter of personalities, they are all parameters that lent the initiative greater legitimacy and facilitated its development and its translation into law. We present a number of them here:

- **An impactful message to advance a social project:** TZCLD is grounded on the three simple principles mentioned earlier ("no-one is unemployable", "there is no shortage of work" and "there is no shortage of money"). It embodies a political project that revolves around work as a factor that sets the individual free in society, while grounding its relevance at a constitutional level by referring to the right to employment that was made law in 1946.

- **An argument backed by figures:** The macro-economic study mentioned above, which assessed the cost of joblessness at between 43 and 50 billion euros per year (Prost, Abrossimov, & Valentin, 2017), subsequently yielded figures that backed up the initiative's reasoning. Because TZCLD posits that the cost of joblessness is high for society, its project sets out to instead channel this cost into creating jobs that are suitable for people deprived of work, and useful for the areas involved.

- **The backing of a member of parliament:** The meeting with the MP Laurent Grandguillaume and the latter's formation of a group of MPs led to the introduction of a bill, which was adopted in 2016.

- **The draft bill's legal robustness:** By virtue of the constitutional revision of 2008, under which the Parliament can submit a bill to the Council of State for an opinion prior to its examination by a commission (Légifrance, 2008), this bill was examined by the Council of State, more specifically in the light of the European standards on questions of competition, prior to its submission to the National Assembly. According to our interlocutors, the Council of State, which had seldom been approached since this constitutional revision, devoted particular attention to this examination.

- **Unanimous approval:** After some lobbying of the various parliamentary groups and a few amendments, all were satisfied with the draft bill and it was unanimously adopted - which is rare in itself - in 2016. The same happened with the second bill, in November 2020, which was aimed at extending and prolonging the testing of the scheme.

- **Political support at legislative and executive levels:** Myriam El Khomri, then Minister of Labour in Manuel Valls' government, added her support to that of the MPs, when the first experimentation bill was adopted in February 2016, and this helped dispel the central government's doubts. Two years later, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, added the "development of the *Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée* experimental scheme, with the vote on the prolongation bill in progress" to the National poverty prevention and combat strategy, presented on 13 September 2018 (French Ministry of Solidarity and Health, 2020). Our contacts believe that this political support played an important role in enabling the adoption of the second experimentation bill.

- **The project owners' economic and political notoriety and legitimacy:** Of all the people who played a fundamental role in the project, we can mention one in particular: Louis Gallois, the chairman of the ETCLD experimentation fund and former chairman of SNCF and CEO of the Airbus Group. The vice-chairman of this Fund, Michel Davy de Virville, has a very detailed knowledge of the political and administrative ecosystem, acquired through his various professional roles. Lastly, Laurent Grandguillaume, a former local and regional council member, then MP from 2012 to 2017, is the chairman of the TZCLD association. According to our contacts, these stakeholders' political, technical and entrepreneurial expertise contributed greatly to the notoriety necessary for the project's development.

- **A suitable distribution of roles within a triptych of organisations:** The central governance team provides financing for and authorises the experimental scheme. The ETCLD fund steers the scheme in a managerial role. The TZCLD association guides and supports the regions who are preparing to join, supports the political project and lays the groundwork for the initiative's next steps.

- **An experimental approach:** Another of the scheme's success factors mentioned by our interviewees lies in the project's decision to accept the uncertainties and begin with an experimental phase. This enables it to made

incremental adjustments as the need arises, as opposed to trying to generalise a new scheme too quickly.

- **Successful collaboration with decentralised State departments and the stakeholders leading work integration initiatives (IAE):** Stakeholders such as Pôle Emploi[19] (state job centres) and the Direccte network (Regional Departments of Enterprise, Competition, Consumer Affairs, Labour and Employment, which have since become "DREETS", "DRIEETS" and "DEETS"[20]), and their ability to manage trial schemes and innovation systems at grassroots level, have played an important role in TZCLD's development. A national partnership agreement signed with Pôle Emploi enables it, for example, to boost regional collaborative initiatives between the agencies and project owners. Moreover, the link with the IAE became stronger throughout the initial experimental phase and has made it possible to develop regional cooperation for the right to employment.

4.2.4. Inhibitors

Right from the beginning, the TZCLD initiative had difficulty gathering stakeholders around the project. In 1994, for example, its initial attempt to run a trial scheme was vetoed by the Préfecture du Maine-et-Loire. Some of the stumbling blocks we discussed during interviews with our contacts are outlined below:

- **A dual effort to persuade:** Before it could present its project to the public authorities, TZCLD had to introduce the work integration scheme stakeholders to the project, answer any questions and persuade them that the initiatives were complementary efforts to uphold the right to employment in a regional context.

- **Difficulties in evaluating the trial:** The IGF (Inspectorate-General of Finance) and the IAS (Inspectorate-General of Social Affairs) were mandated by the scientific committee tasked with evaluating the law, and in October 2019 submitted their report the economic evaluation of the ETCLD trial scheme (Lallemand-Kirche, et al., 2019). However, because this study chose not to take into consideration certain costs that had been avoided through the elimination of joblessness, the fund for the regional trial scheme and the

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[19] Pôle emploi is a public administrative establishment (EPA) in charge of employment in France.
[20]DREETS, the Regional Department of the Economy, Employment, Work and Solidarities, is a delocalised State department located in each metropolitan French region. In this instance, it is the DRIEETS in Île-de-France and the DEETS units in overseas France.

TZCLD association published their own analysis report in November 2019 (TZCLD & ETCLD, 2019). Quoting the macro-economic study by ATD Quart-Monde, ETCLD and TZCLD state that the elimination of unemployment does indeed make it possible to avoid certain collective costs (in particular in terms of health and delinquency). Accordingly, they re-incorporate in their analysis the avoided cost, estimated at €3,300 per equivalent-full-time job, whereas the IGAS-IGF mission had chosen to exclude them and had indicated a nil cost, calling for caution with regard to estimates and hypotheses of this sort. Lastly, it should be noted that TZCLD is currently launching its own research laboratory, which aims to encourage project stakeholders and researchers from various disciplines to work together on creating a research dynamic into the effects produced by the right to employment in the areas concerned.

- **Highly mediatised criticisms:** Based on the inconclusive results of the above-mentioned external evaluations, certain observers voiced criticisms of the project, in particular through opinion editorials published in various media with varying political leanings. Le Monde (Cahuc, 2020), Les Echos (Cahuc, 2019) and Libération (Loss, 2020), for example, echoed these views.

- **The language barrier:** Despite the project's international relevance, it is important to translate the resources into English so that social innovation initiatives can be tested and upscaled outside France. Our contact confirms that there is a real need for this, since they do not have the necessary resources themselves.

4.2.5. Outlook

The trial phase has entered its second stage (2021-2024), aimed at gradually obtaining approval for at least 50 new areas. TZCLD is preparing for the next steps and contending with various challenges.

On one hand, the project's capacity for upscaling has yet to be confirmed. After having set up around 15 EBE companies, TZCLD considers that the approach works, but is continuing to work on certain difficulties. The project has entered its intermediate phase, situated between the experimental phase and the phase in which the project has achieved permanence. The regional trial schemes, which were managing 10 areas following the first experimentation bill, are aiming for a six-fold increase, incorporating at least 50 new territories over three years.

On the other hand, the issue of evaluation mentioned in the previous paragraph remains a key challenge. Given that experimentation is, by nature, a process that

calls for evaluation, the TZCLD association has set out to observe all of the outcomes of its initiative in the various regions. According to them, the initiative has effects on not only the people employed but also their family and friends, and creates a broader regional dynamic. To evaluate these external factors, the association is creating its own research laboratory, mentioned above.

Lastly, encouraged by the interest and enthusiasm for the TZCLD initiative shown by stakeholders in Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Austria, along with EU commissioners and MPs, the association is interested in moving towards a European consortium of the right to employment.

4.3. Samusocial de Paris

4.3.1. Summary of the main lessons learnt

Presentation	The Samusocial de Paris was set up in 1993 to combat large-scale exclusion by going out to make contact with the people concerned, to maintain or recreate a social bond, elicit demand and search for the most adequate response.
Drivers and success factors	• Detect the needs as close as possible to the ground • Test new solutions • Mobilise private funds to finance the experimental phase • Maintain a faculty for innovation • Develop advocacy to influence policies
Inhibitors	• The initial mission's temporary nature has turned into a long-term effort • The emergency shelter system is saturated and there are no alternatives • Government initiatives are judged insufficient to fully accomplish the mission • Complexity of the governance mode (GIP, public-interest group)

4.3.2. Project presentation

The Samusocial de Paris (SSP) was created in 1993 following a meeting between Xavier Emmanuelli, a doctor at the shelter for homeless people in Nanterre, and Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris. They were convinced of the need to pool the resources of the local stakeholders concerned by the homelessness problem, so they drew together the public and private spheres to address this social emergency initiative, which took the form of a Public-Interest Group (GIP)[21]. The board of directors of Samusocial de Paris is currently made up of the State, the City of Paris, Assistance Publique des Hôpitaux de Paris, the Social Action Centre of the City of Paris, the RATP[22], the SNCF[23], the Regional Health Authority (ARS), the Caisse Primare d'Assurance Maladie (CPAM) and the Fédération des Acteurs de la Solidarité (Samusocial de Paris, 2022).

The Samusocial de Paris typically takes a more outreach-oriented approach, grounded on principles of unconditionality, of people's freedom to accept or decline the help offered to them, and of developing a holistic approach.

Its action revolves around four main public-interest missions, serving homeless people and families in the Ile-de-France region:

1. Propose an initial contact, an evaluation and a referral.
2. Provide shelter, house, care and general support.
3. Regulate the supply and demand for shelter and housing, coordinate and led the network of social emergency stakeholders and monitor people's itinerary.
4. Observe, document and conduct advocacy to improve the situation of the people supported.

The SSP deploys mobile teams of professionals (social workers, special educational needs teachers, doctors, nurses, nurses' aids, coordinators, etc.) who reach out to homeless people in an effort to maintain or recreate a social bond and provided responses to the needs expressed. It also provides assistance and guidance for homeless people. Since its inception, it has managed the 115 national emergency

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[21] A public interest group enables the public and private partners to pool resources for carrying out general-interest missions. A GIP is a legal person under public law, with administrative and financial autonomy, constituted by a State-approved Agreement (French Ministry of Finance and Public Account, 2019).

[22] The RATP (Paris public transport authority) is a public industrial and commercial establishment (EPIC). It manages the operation of part of the public transport system in Paris and its suburbs.

[23] The SNCF is a French public railway undertaking. It is a public limited company (société anonyme à capitaux publics) whose sole shareholder is the State.

number in Paris; accommodation in emergency accommodation centres (CHU); medical care in dedicated healthcare beds (LHSS) and welfare guidance and support, for instance.

In 2020, the SSP's mobile assistance teams had reached out to 28,000 people on the rounds made by six or seven vans per night, and nearly 333,000 calls had been received by the 115 in Paris. The Samusocial de Paris had accommodation for 660 people in CHU, stopovers and family accommodation, while around 29,000 separate families had been accommodated through the Accommodation and Hotel Reservation unit of the SSP (Samusocial de Paris, 2020).

4.3.3. Drivers and success factors

The projects conducted by the Samusocial de Paris are managed in coordination with the public authorities and the stakeholders combating all forms of exclusion, as shown by the history of several of its trial schemes. We present a number of them here as we analyse the success factors behind the SSP's initiative.

- **An ability to detect needs as close as possible to the ground:** Based on the observation that there are still citizens deprived of the fundamental right to have a roof over their heads in a developed country such as France, the SSP challenges the way things are done and questions the existing public policies in the light of the needs of the people concerned. The paths of these people are individual and distinctive, and the problem of homelessness involves many factors and many dimensions. The SSP considers that only by banding together will stakeholders be able to provide effective solutions, through collaborative endeavours between the public authorities and the private sphere (businesses, associations, citizens, etc.). By reaching out directly to people in situations of social distress in the course of its rounds, the SSP is in a position to detect needs on the ground. Its approach will then be to build and test innovative schemes, before potentially upscaling them with the backing of public policy.

- **Mobilise private funds to finance the experimental phase:** Being able to draw on direct funding from corporate sponsorship or private citizens' donations is a valuable aid in launching experimental initiatives, as the director of the Samusocial de Paris has confirmed to us. Since there is an element of risk in any innovation, this aid finances the risk with private funds before, or on top of, public funds.

- **From experimental initiatives to inclusion in law:** The history of the SSP shows that, on several occasions, it has been possible to turn experimental schemes into general practice through public action. The creation of the 115 national emergency number in 1997 followed the SSP's management of a local Paris number since 1995. The accreditation of the stopover healthcare beds (LHSS) in shelters in 2006 followed SSP's trial schemes since 1996. The idea of the LHSS dates back to 1996, when the Samusocial de Paris offered nursing beds in hospital to offset the limitations of medical care in the street and the poor hygiene in accommodation centres, in the face of the polypathologies often developed by people living in the street. Under the current French law on social action and families, the project enjoyed the status of an experimental structure and was therefore able to obtain public financing on top of private contributions. A 2005 law then created healthcare beds in homeless shelters (LHSS) and laid down the principle for their financing (Légifrance, 2005). A 2006 decree defined their operation (Légifrance, 2006). Other decrees and circulars complete the legislative and regulatory framework for LHSS, including the national call for projects for the creation of these structures (Housing Ministry, 2021). According to the general director of the SSP, this inclusion in law provided a certain recognition by confirming the pertinence of the need identified. It also provided a degree of security for the trial scheme, which took permanent shape in the form of social and medico-social establishments and services, thereby obliging the authorities to formally define the rights and the contribution of the people receiving support. Since then, LHSS have been set up by stakeholders other than the SSP, and all provide health care and social assistance for homeless people.

- **A lasting faculty for innovation:** The SSP was first stakeholder to have tested large-scale accommodation for homeless people in a hotel. In the early 2000s, it noticed an increase in calls to the 115 number on the part of families. This emergency phone number and its accommodation solutions had been designed for homeless people arriving singly, so the SSP began developing more accommodation in hotels. Today, nearly 60,000 people, or around 20,000 households, are housed every day by the Samusocial de Paris in over 850 hotels in Ile-de-France (Samusocial de Paris, 2022). This represents half of the organisation's accommodation possibilities in the region. While there are short-term advantages to this solution (the accommodation is easy to buy and flexible, for instance), it is not a long-term solution for accommodation. The downsides mentioned by our contact include the impossibility of cooking, of providing privacy for a large family,

and the negative effects on children's development. Having noted that the average duration of a stay in a hotel was two and a half years, the SSP decided to test different solutions for providing these families with social support. The mobile social intervention team (EMIS) provided support with accessing families' rights, healthcare and housing. Up until September 2020, the OPALE mission (Objective: Priority to Housing and Employment) offered comprehensive guidance and support for families who had been in hotel accommodation for over four years (Samusocial de Paris, 2019). At the same time, the SSP worked on improving families' living conditions through the "living better in a hotel" programme launched in 2014 and which was greatly in demand in 2020 during the first lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

- **A force for advocacy to influence public policies:** On top of these experimental schemes, the Samusocial de Paris is developing advocacy initiatives with the public authorities, in particular on the subject of accommodation in hotels. Based on an ENFAMS survey published in 2014 by the Observatoire du Samusocial de Paris, which stated, for example, that over eight out of every ten families were experiencing food insecurity (Observatoire du Samusocial de Paris, 2014), the SSP asked the State for a plan to find an alternative to hotel accommodation. According to the executive officer of Samusocial de Paris, this advocacy will contribute to the State's creation of a platform providing social support in hotels in each department in Ile-de-France. The SSP launched the AGATE platform (which provides comprehensive support for accessing rights and combating exclusions) in January 2021, after being selected in a call for projects in Paris (in the 75 department). AGATE brings together the EMIS and OPALE experimental schemes and oversees nearly 900 households, who receive guidance and support from teams of social workers, technicians in social and family support, legal experts, etc. (Samusocial de Paris, 2022).

4.3.4. Inhibitors

- **When temporary measures become permanent:** The Samusocial de Paris was initially set up on a temporary basis and was not intended to last. Its founding agreement provided for a limited lifetime. After several extensions, the GIP was finally granted an unlimited lifetime through a rider to this agreement, signed by the partners in 2016 (Mairie de Paris, 2016), acknowledging a certain institutionalisation and permanency of the SSP.

- **The lack of alternatives for the beneficiaries:** During our interview, the general director of the SSP did indeed mention the difficulty for beneficiaries to leave the system. For want of alternatives, it can be difficult to get beneficiaries to leave their accommodation in a hospital, hotel or LHSS, which raises the question of finding accommodation for new people.

- **A system stretched to the limit:** Because the capacity for accommodation is limited, the Samusocial de Paris regularly issues an alert about the situation. The number of calls to the 115 emergency number in Paris every day can vary widely from one month to the next. In 2020, it was between 1,500 and 10,000 calls; on average, around 1,000 calls were answered (Samusocial de Paris, 2020). For want of resources and available accommodation, not all calls can be taken nor processed. Moreover, the shortage of accessible accommodation, particularly in areas such as Île-de-France (Gayet, 2018), and the saturation of accommodation centres and hotels (Charente Libre, 2019) (Rey-Lefebvre, 2021) are matters of great concern for SSP and often reported by the media.

- **Government measures deemed insufficient:** The State endeavours to address these issues but is unable to satisfy the expectations of stakeholders in the field. The national strategy to prevent and combat poverty, presented in 2018, is an example. Despite the involvement of the Samusocial de Paris in drawing up this strategy, through the joint chairmanship of one of the six working groups by Christine Laconde, then director of the SSP (French Ministry of Solidarity and Health, 2018), the government's commitments fell short of the needs, according to the former Chairman of the SSP, Eric Pliez. While nevertheless recognising certain advances, the latter criticised the lack of consideration for those in the most precarious circumstances, citing the State's removal of funding for the major hospitals (Rey-Lefebvre, 2018). Other stakeholders, such as the Fondation Abbé Pierre, also point out the shortcomings in the government's action. In the latter's annual report for 2022, it notes that "the poorest continue to be completely overlooked by this government", even though 300,000 people are said to be homeless in France (Fondation Abbé Pierre, 2022).

- **A complex method of governance:** The Samusocial de Paris is a Public Interest Group. Its chairman is appointed by agreement between the State and the City of Paris. As it happens, following Éric Pliez's resignation in October 2019 after three terms of office, several months passed before the two parties reached an agreement. According to an article published in Le

Monde on 14 December 2019, the parties failed to agree on the future chairman's profile: senior public servant or prominent personality from the non-profit community (Rey-Lefebvre, 2019)? An agreement was nevertheless reached in February 2020 with the appointment of Alain Christnacht, a former senior public servant.

4.3.5. Outlook

When asked about the outlook and the upscaling of the Samusocial's initiatives in Paris, our interviewee made several key points. Firstly, the SSP was eager to stress the utility of its actions in the face of the overwhelming exclusion of homeless people, stressing the necessity of its aid and the very real, pressing existence of these social needs. Its activity report and its Observatory's research projects contribute to this. Secondly, the evaluation of the SSP's actions and of their impact on the beneficiaries is another important factor of which the public authorities should be made aware. Thirdly, the director of the SSP underscored the necessary partnership strategy that is deployed with their co-financiers, the local authorities and all of their public and private partners in order to take effective action on multi-factor problems. Lastly, the SSP is careful to display a certain agility that allows it to stay current and respond to calls for projects. It plays an active role in upgrading public policies. This might be during the national working groups led by the government ministries or locally-managed initiatives (such as regional strategy for developing and adapting accommodation, departmental action plan for the housing and accommodation of underprivileged people, the Paris Pact against exclusion, among others).

This partnership work is essential for it to present its schemes and endeavour to write them into the public policies under construction. During the local council elections in Paris in 2020, for example, the SSP took the initiative of gathering together a hundred or so people accommodated in centres or in social hotels, to discuss their difficulties and together construct a set of arguments. This group, dubbed "the Ongoing Debate", selected 15 proposals, which were then sent out to the leading election candidates. Two candidates, including the one who went on to win the election, submitted a response to this initiative(Samusocial de Paris, 2020).

Advocacy is an essential tool for upscaling with the backing of public policy. Before that, though, the first step is to test any new scheme on the ground, as mentioned above. Before achieving a "proof of concept" that demonstrates its feasibility and qualifies it to be written into public policy, the ability to collect financial resources through corporate sponsorship or private citizens' donations is invaluable for the Samusocial de Paris.

At international level, the methods developed by the Samusocial de Paris are inspiring and have been adopted by many countries today. The Samusocial International association, set up by Xavier Emmanuelli in 1998, provides support and guidance on structuring aid schemes for people suffering from social exclusion in various world cities. These structures all share a common operating method, a charter and a code of conduct (Samusocial International, 2022).

4.4. Conclusion: from social innovation to public policy

Before we start looking into the parallels that can be drawn between these two case studies, there are a few points to watch out for in the analysis. Two case studies cannot provide an exhaustive depiction of the French social innovation ecosystem, nor suggest a "model" to follow for each initiative that sets out to obtain support or inclusion in public policy.

Moreover, certain specific features of these projects deserve to come under the spotlight here. With regard to the Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée project, numerous leading figures from politics or business have come to lend their support to the project in recent years. The case study shows that an MP played a fundamental role in constructing the first experimentation bill, before a Labour Minister and then a President of the Republic in turn lent the project their support. In a parallel move, the chairmanship of the ETCLD experimentation fund was passed on to a recognised businessman and a former senior public servant.

As for the Samusocial de Paris, its special status as a Public Interest Group enables it to bring together public and private-sector partners to undertake general interest missions. The main decision-makers and partners in policies to combat exclusion (the State, the City of Paris, SNCF, RATP, Assistance Publique des Hôpitaux de Paris, etc.) sit on its Board of Directors. The former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris and future President of the Republic, was one of the project's earliest supporters.

Over and above political figures' support, another observation we can make is the time frame in which these projects are written into public policy. From the initial idea and testing through to being laid down in law, both the TZCLD project and the LHSS project championed by the SSP had to demonstrate a certain degree of patience. After an initial, unsuccessful trial in 1994, TZCLD was later relaunched in 2011 prior to the adoption of the first experimentation law in 2016, extended by a second law in 2020. Despite these successes, the project remains in an intermediate phase, between testing and perpetuation. With regard to the LHSS, 10 years went by

between the time the first actions were launched and their legislative approval in 2006 in the form of social and medico-social establishments and services.

From the two case studies, it was also apparent that an experimental approach seems to be a prerequisite for any social innovation that wants to stay the distance. Our contacts at TZCLD see it as a key success factor for their initiative. This is borne out by examples at the Samusocial de Paris: the 115 national emergency number, the LHSS and the AGATE platform all went through an experimental stage before earning recognition or even nationwide uptake by the public authorities. In the meantime, it seems that advocacy initiatives are another key aspect of upscaling these experimental schemes.

Lastly, we can note that the social needs addressed by TZCLD and the SSP are unanimous and unifying. The issues of unemployment and homelessness are indeed clearly identified by civil society, addressed by initiatives – in particular philanthropic initiatives – by private stakeholders, and are a matter of public policy.

Social innovation initiatives are often expected to back their arguments with figures in order to demonstrate the results and effects of their action, and in so doing, justify financial support from the company or the taxpayer. This subject was brought up during our interview with TZCLD, but also with the SSP. Nonetheless, the difficulty lies in the nature and the scope of the "social" effects and impacts that have to be evaluated and measured.

Unlike financial results, which are measured and calculated using standardised, recognised methods, the evaluation of social impact rests on methods and tools that vary with the specific context of a particular project (Avise, 2021). As for the causal links between the project's action and a more "indirect" impact, they can sometimes be difficult to establish. Taking the TZCLD project as an example, the ATD Quart-Monde study posited that eliminating joblessness would, indirectly, have positive effects on health and delinquency. While this study estimated the avoided costs at €3,300 per full-time equivalent, the IGAS-IGF mission took a more cautious approach to such hypotheses, which it considered difficult to prove, and chose to indicate an avoided cost of nil. Whether because of a lack of available data, time or human and financial resources, evaluating social impact is a challenging undertaking.

5. Conclusions

The map of the French social innovation ecosystem established throughout this report provides a number of answers to the initial survey question: "What factors foster (favourable conditions) or hinder (unfavourable conditions) the upscaling of social innovations or their translation into public policies for the benefit of fragile people?".

Let's begin by pointing out that social innovation is amply recognised in French legislation and policy-making. Social innovation was defined in the SSE Law in 2014 and incorporated into numerous regional and also national policies. The sweeping presidential project "La France s'engage" launched in 2014 by François Hollande and the French Impact initiative introduced by Emmanuel Macron are just two examples. While La France s'engage sought out SSE initiatives that "aim to open up new solutions and imagine the policies of tomorrow" (Hollande, 2014), French Impact defined itself as a "public policy for promoting and supporting social innovation" in order to place "social impact at the heart of France's transformation" (Ministry of Ecology and Solidarity, 2018). However, this State support hinges on political decisions, so can change or be called into question, depending on the strategic priorities from one government to the next. The initiative La France s'engage, for example, was turned into a foundation after François Hollande's departure from the presidency. Moreover, some of the decisions made are not to the advantage of social innovation stakeholders, such as the decision to end the system of subsidised jobs (Schatzman, 2020) or to stop subsiding emergency accommodation centres (Rey-Lefebvre, 2018). Public policies must be able to more effectively take these factors into account and support the upscaling of social innovations that transform our society.

Secondly, the social innovation support ecosystem is very rich, compared to other European countries. There are numerous local offers of support and guidance, which are well mapped and structured into national networks. However, even though social innovators can obtain the guidance they need from various stakeholders and platforms, the offering could be made clearer and more visible, given that the environment is very prone to change. Moreover, the concept of social innovation is still too unfamiliar to stakeholders outside the SSE field and is sometimes not sufficiently thought out in policies aimed at accelerating innovation, in the broad sense, in France.

Lastly, the financing of this support, which is often free for project owners with the cost assumed by third parties, represents another major challenge for the sector.

Cooperative arrangements with public and private stakeholders, especially for financial support, are therefore crucial for ensuring the long-term survival and development of these support schemes and, it follows, of social innovations (Avise, 2022).

As for the financing of social innovation, numerous possibilities have also been mentioned in this report, from the private sector (social impact banks and investors, among others) to the French public sphere (Banque des Territoires, Bpifrance, "invest in skills" plan, social impact bonds, etc.) and the European public sector (ESF). To make further progress, public decision-makers and banking networks, among others, must nevertheless be made more aware of social innovation. The legal status and the experimental phase of social innovation projects are some of the factors that could potentially impede access to certain types of financing. And yet this is a crucial factor for ensuring that social innovation can prosper in both Europe and France. In 2020, the European Commission estimated that, per year, European social enterprises lack between 321 and 783 million euros of debt financing and between 230 and 605 million euros of equity (Commission européenne, 2019). In the French context, a number of stakeholders and reports point to a lack of debt financing in the seed phase for SSE companies supporting social innovations, estimated at several tens of millions of euros per year (PULSE, 2021; Bernard-Colinet, 2020). On this point, the Samusocial de Paris stresses the importance of private backers for financing the social innovation's experimental phase.

The experimental stage is an integral part of the social innovation process, as we can see from the example of the Samusocial de Paris and the healthcare beds in homeless shelters (LHSS). According to the TZCLD scheme, this ability to embrace uncertainty, together with the project's capacity for adjustment, are key factors for the initiative's success.

Lastly, there are many challenges involved in evaluating an innovation's social impact. For example, the social innovators must have a solid grounding in the subject and the expected impacts must be readily measurable, so this aspect requires special attention. Other challenges include providing guidance and support for evaluation, and financing the evaluation process. As a social innovation skills centre, Avise manages a national resource centre for social impact evaluation, whose mission is, precisely, to raise the ecosystem's awareness of these issues and provide the necessary tools, to promote the new practices and to foster interaction among the stakeholders.

In conclusion, given the many societal and environmental challenges posed in the 21st century, social innovation and the social and solidarity economy stakeholders

who lead it are admittedly offering solutions, but the sheer scope and scale of these challenges make it necessary to upscale them.

Many favourable conditions for upscaling social innovation can be identified in the French ecosystem, though there are also many points to work on and pressing challenges. Given that social innovations are often constructed to address a local need, alongside partners of the region concerned, not all of them can or will be upscaled or become public policy. Those that lend themselves to this can receive various forms of support at regional and national level, but not all of their support and financing needs are covered. The handful of upscaling support programmes tested for structures with national reach, such as La France s'engage, the Antropia ESSEC programmes or the "P'INS" programme supported by the Fondation Macif and Avise, all combined, select only about 30 projects each year from hundreds of submissions. Over and above these programmes and the local support scheme present throughout France at regional and departmental level, there is still a need for an ambitious and permanent offering of guidance and support for social innovations on a national scale.

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7. Appendices

7.1. Appendix 1: Short form

Survey of social innovations introduced for the benefit of fragile people

Introduction

Thank you for taking part!
This survey campaign is open until midnight on 3 December 2021.
The questionnaire shouldn't take you more than 5 to 10 minutes to complete.

The social innovation project that you list here can be a project that you know about, or your own project!

BuiCaSuS – Building Capacities for Sustainable Societies – is a project financed by the European Union and aimed at promoting the practice of social innovation in four countries: France, Spain, Latvia and Sweden. The European Commission has tasked the project with carrying out a national mapping exercise that, combined with a pilot programme and transnational learning activities, will lead to the establishment or consolidation of a National Skills Centre for social innovation in each member state.
This questionnaire is the first step in a broader process of selecting and analysing the national social innovation ecosystem.
At this stage, we want to generate a list of social innovation initiatives conducted for the benefit of fragile people (projects in the field of disability, mental health, addictions, senior citizens, migrations, homelessness, etc.).
Following this questionnaire, we will analyse some of these projects in greater depth, directly with the project owners, by means of a more detailed questionnaire and individual interviews

Thank you in anticipation of your contribution.

Question	Type	Response options
Section 1 – A few details about yourself		
1. FAMILY NAME, Given name	Open, short, required	
2. E-mail address	Open, short, required	
3. Organisation	Open, short, required	
Section 2 – A few details about the project		

4. Name of the project/the organisation that you recommend	Open, short, required	
5. Describe the project in a few lines	Open, long, required	
6. Project's fields of operation and target populations (more than one answer possible)	Multiple choice, required	Personal care; Disability; Addictions; Mental health; Children and teens; Elderly people; Refugees; Homelessness; Other
7. If you replied "Other", please specify:	Open, long, optional	
8. The project's geographical scope (more than one answer possible)	Multiple choice, required	International; National; Regional; Departmental; Local
9. If you replied "Local", please specify:	Open, long, optional	
10. What stakeholders are involved in the project, through financial and/or operational partnerships? (More than one answer possible)	Multiple choice, required	SSE sector; "Traditional" economic sector; Foundations; Local authority/authorities; Metropolitan France; Department; Region; State
11. Date project was created	Open, short, optional	
12. Is the project still active?	Yes / No, required	
13. Main sources of financing (>5% of the budget): (more than one answer possible)	Multiple choice, required	Sales of goods and/or services; Public financing; European public financing; Sponsorship; Private donations; Other; Don't know
14. If you replied "Other", please specify:	Open, short, optional	
15. Did the project receive support? (e.g. coaching programme, mentoring, consulting services, etc.)	Yes / No / Don't know, required	

16. If so, what type of support did it receive?	Multiple choice, optional	Start-up support; Help with the financing strategy; Development / Upscaling of the project; Project evaluation (impact measurement)
17. Is the project's operation (types of action, business model, types of partnership, etc.) documented in a transparent and accessible way?	Yes / No / Don't know, required	
18. Has the project assessed its impact?	Yes / No / Don't know, required	
19. Does the project contain a digital component in its relations with its beneficiaries? (e.g. a mobile app)	Yes / No / Don't know, required	
Section 3 – The project's contact info		
20. FAMILY NAME, Given name of the contact person(for the project in question)	Open, short, required	
21. Email address	Open, short, required	
22. Telephone number	Open, short, optional	
23. Project website	Open, short, required	
24. Any comments	Open, short, optional	
25. Data management I agree with the confidentiality policy: https://buicasus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/BuiCaSuS_politique_de_protection_des_donnees.pdf	Closed, required	"I acknowledge and agree"

7.2. Appendix 2: List of social innovation initiatives surveyed (Phase 1)

Atelier Paysages et Ressources

A vos Soins (Projet MarSOINS)

Air Marin expérience Rupture - l'AMeR

AGORAé (projet de FAGE)

Alenvi

ANTS

APF France Handicap

Article 1

Association Resonantes

Association Aurore

Association Entourage

Auticiel

Caire 13

Carton Plein

Causons

Cohabilis

Comme les Autres

Croix-Rouge française

DAHLIR

DEFI (de l'association GRDR)

Droits d'urgence

Each One

Emmaüs

Envie Autonomie

Famileo

Fédération Simon de Cyrène

Groupe SOS

Habitat et Humanisme

Jaccede

Kabubu

Kodiko

La Ferme de Moyembrie

La Maison des Femmes

La Maison des plus petits

Lazare

Le Carillon (par La Cloche)

L'Ecole des Cuistots Migrateurs

Les Cafés Joyeux

Les Cités d'Or

Les Grands Voisins

Les Invités au Festin

Médecins du Monde

MONALISA

OTEMA (dont projet Plateforme SAMI)

Permis de Construire

Premiers de cordée

L'Escale (projet de Basiliade)

Rose Up

Samusocial de Paris

Secours Catholique - Caritas France

Secours Populaire Français

Siel Bleu

Silver Geek

SINGA

SNC (Solidarités Nouvelles face au Chômage)

Solinum

TAPAJ

Toit à Moi

Tom et Josette

Tous Tes Possibles

E-FABRIK (de l'association TRACES)

Unis Cité

Utopia 56

Wake Up Café

Wheeliz

Wimoov

Bus Mobile Informatique (B.M.I)

Projet Soft Skills

Second Air

DUODAY

Le Logement D'abord

Territoires Zéro Chômeurs de Longue Durée

HAPPY Les hameaux inclusifs

7.3. Appendix 3: List of partners

- La Délégation générale à l'emploi et à la formation professionnelle (DGEFP, Le Lab)
- Le Laboratoire Commun DESTINS (Dynamique des entreprises, de la société, et des territoires vers l'innovation sociale)
- Institut Godin
- La 27è Région
- SAS INCO Ventures
- Groupe Macif Corporate Foundation

7.4. Appendix 4: Detailed form

Social innovations for the benefit of fragile people – BuiCaSuS

Introduction

Thank you for taking part!

Following a survey of social innovation initiatives designed for fragile people in France, we selected 20 organisations or projects, including your own.
We would now like to offer you the opportunity to answer an online questionnaire in order to provide a more detailed presentation of your initiatives and the conditions that either facilitated or hindered their development.
This questionnaire should take you about 20 minutes to complete.

Your input will feed into work on analysing the national social innovation ecosystem, conducted within the framework of the BuiCaSuS European project.

Following this questionnaire, we may be led to contact you again for further details about certain points during an individual interview, which will be the final step of this process.
In any case, we will keep you informed of the outcomes of this work.

Find out more about the BuiCaSuS project
BuiCaSuS – Building Capacities for Sustainable Societies – is a project financed by the European Union and aimed at promoting the practice of social innovation in four countries: France, Spain, Latvia and Sweden. The European Commission has tasked the project with carrying out a national mapping exercise that, combined with a pilot programme and transnational learning activities, will lead to the establishment or consolidation of a National Skills Centre for social innovation in each member state.

Thank you in anticipation of your contribution.

Question	Type	Response options
Section 1 – Contact person		
1. FAMILY NAME, Given name	Open, short, required	
2. Organisation	Open, short, required	
3. Contact email address	Open, short, required	

4. Contact phone number	Open, short, optional	
Section 2 – The project's key info		
5. Project name	Open, short, required	
6. Short description of the project	Open, long, required	
7. Project's fields of operation and target populations (more than one answer possible)	Multiple choice, required	Personal care; Disability; Addictions; Mental health; Children and teens; Elderly people; Refugees; Homelessness; Other
8. If you replied "Other", please specify:	Open, short, optional	
9. Geographical scope (more than one answer possible)	Multiple choice, required	International; National; Regional; Departmental; Local
10. The project's setting is…	Multiple choice, required	Urban; Rural; Not applicable
11. Date project was created	Open, short, required	
12. Is the project still active?	Yes / No, required	
13. What impacts will the project have? Describe how the project operates. For example, how it alleviates poverty and improves social inclusion (or any other objective explicitly stated by the organisation). Do the project's actions directly or indirectly contribute to reducing poverty, to improving people's well-being, to exercising human rights and to living life in dignity? At what level is the impact deployed: at individual level or at the level of the group, the community or society?	Open, long, required	
14. Nature of the social innovation The project can be a social innovation through one or more of these aspects:	Multiple choice, required	New need (identifies and meets a new, unmet need); New product/service (meets existing or new needs, whether individual or collective); New method(s) (in terms of production, delivery, etc. This includes new technologies, new forms of organisation, new partnerships, etc.); New stakeholders (involvement in the

		project of stakeholders who were not previously involved).
15. Please specify what makes the project innovative	Open, long, required	
16. Are the project's financial data accessible?	Yes/No, optional	
17. Total sales 2020	Open, short, optional	
Section 3 – Participation, capacity building and transparency		
18. To what sector does the organisation belong?	Multiple choice, required	SSE sector; "Conventional" private sector; Public sector; Civil society; Other
19. What other stakeholders are involved in the project?	Multiple choice, required	SSE sector; "Conventional" private sector; Public sector (local authorities); Public sector (department); Public sector (region); Public sector (State); Civil society
20. How are the beneficiaries/users mobilised? How does the initiative support and stimulate empowerment while meeting users' needs? Is a bottom-up approach used? How is user uptake secured? Is it participatory or at least suited to their needs? Does the idea for the project come from citizens? If the project was introduced "top down" (i.e. by decision of the authorities), how was user adoption secured? Were users given support to help them adapt to the community's needs and context?	Open, long, required	
21. Is the project improving cooperation between various stakeholders? Has the project brought in new stakeholders, built new partnerships and transformed social relations by getting the beneficiaries and users involved?	Open, long, required	
22. How is the SSE sector strengthened? Has the project increased the SSE's influence, boosted its capacities, created new leaders or reinforced the SSE's power to influence public policies?	Open, long, required	
23. Transparency and communication Is the project's communication transparent? Are there facilities for beneficiaries to provide feedback?	Open, short, required	
Section 4 – External support		
24. Main sources of financing (>5% of the budget)	Multiple choice, optional	Own funds; Public financing (European); Public financing (State); Public financing (Region, Department, local

		authorities, etc.); Sponsorship; Private donations; Crowdfunding; Other
25. Please specify what proportion (in %) this financing represents in the project's budget	Open, long, optional	
26. Did the project receive support? (from an incubator, consulting services, mentoring, etc.)	Yes/No, required	
27. If so, please describe the types of support received:	Open, long, optional	
Section 5 – Learning, evaluation, viability		
28. Has the project been documented and/or has the logic behind the initiative been made explicit?	Yes/No, required	
29. If yes, please insert a link to the resources in question (web page, handbook, report, etc.)	Open, short, optional	
30. Has the project assessed its impact?	Yes/No, required	
31. If yes, please insert a link to the resources in question (web page, handbook, report, etc.)	Open, short, optional	
32. Learning and iteration Over the project's lifetime, have certain approaches and actions been discarded or adjusted? If so, which ones?	Open, long, required	
33. Does the project contain a digital component in its relations with its beneficiaries? (e.g. a mobile app)	Yes/No, required	
34. If so, please describe it	Open, long, optional	
35. Viability Are measures taken to ensure the project's viability? If so, which ones? How are the resources necessary to maintain the project generated?	Open, long, required	
Section 6 – Upscaling and relations with public policy		
36. Has the project been upscaled or replicated? Is that part of the project's purpose? Has the project extended its action beyond its initial location/scope? Does it have the capacity for upscaling or for replication to other groups and contexts to achieve greater impact? If so, is there a strategy for implementing this upscaling?	Open, long, required	
37. Systemic and cultural changes: does the project contribute to positive changes in behaviours, mindsets or values? Is the project aimed at raising awareness of the problems encountered by vulnerable populations? Does the project usher in a change of values, standards or perceptions of others, reducing the social distance between groups, while fostering solidarity and cohesion?	Open, long, required	
38. Relations with public policies and universal services: does the project operate in coordination with, or does it complement universal public services?	Open, long, required	
25. Data management I agree with the confidentiality policy: https://buicasus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/BuiCaSuS_politique_de_protection_des_donnees.pdf	Closed, required	"I acknowledge and agree"

7.5. Appendix 5: List of social innovation initiatives that met Phase 2

Cohabilis

Unis-Cité

DAHLIR

Emmaüs France

Yes We Camp

Envie Autonomie

APF France Handicap

Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée

Les invités au festin

Article 1

La Cloche

Samusocial de Paris

Wimoov

Habitat et Humanisme

7.6. Appendix 6: Individual interview framework.

The interviews conducted with the Territoires Zéro Chômeur de Longue Durée and Samusocial de Paris projects drew on the list of questions presented below. This framework is for guidance only: these interactions were conducted in a semi-structured format.

- What is the vision of society presented by your project?
- What advocacy and messages do you present to the public authorities?
- By definition, social innovation concerns public policy issues. Do you think that upscaling social innovation (to amplify its impact) necessarily requires a law?
- Who were the key stakeholders involved in the project's inception, and what role did they play?
- What stakeholders enabled the project's subsequent development, and what role did they play?
- What were the key stages in the project's life and development? What influence did these stages have on the project?
- What do you consider to have been the key success factors in your initiative, and in particular for its translation into public policy?
- What do you consider to have been the key success factors outside your project, i.e. relating to the ecosystem?
- What do you think acted as inhibitors or obstacles?
- What were the repercussions of your project's translation into public policy?
- What are your project's development focuses today?
- In the French context, what do you see as the enabling conditions for the development of social innovations, and in particular their collaboration with public authority?
- On the contrary, what do you see as the main obstacles encountered by social innovators as they scale up and in their collaboration with the public authorities?

7.7. Appendix 7: List of interviewees

Antonin Gregorio, CEO, Association Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée

Jeanne Bot, Head of Advocacy, Association Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée

Victoria Bazurto, Head of Research-Evaluation, Association Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée

Vanessa Benoit, Director, Samusocial de Paris